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International Law and Private Foreign Investment
ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, C.B.E., Q.C."

Thank you, Dean Aman, for your generous words of welcome. As you
sought to persuade our audience of my virtues, I initially experienced some
sense of disbelief and wondered whether you could really be speaking of me.
As your description progressed, I began to be persuaded by your advocacy.
By the time you had finished, I had so entered into the spirit of the matter that
I even began to think that perhaps you were not saying enough.
I am delighted to be here-as is my wife. We immensely appreciate the
hospitality that is being shown to us by yourself and by this distinguished Law
School. My entry into the United States was not free of difficulty. It seemed
that I had not matched the excellent administrative work of the Dean's office
by securing a visa appropriate to one who was deemed to be coming here to
work rather than to enjoy himself. The immigration official threatened to ban
my giving this lecture, even to exclude me. I welcomed his proposal saying
that I would be glad to forego the lecture and explain to the audience why I
could not continue to address it. My response was, alas, entirely counterproductive. A visa was immediately granted. The truth is, in fact, that nothing
could give me more pleasure, or make me feel more privileged, than to have
been afforded the present opportunity to deliver the first of the Earl Snyder
lectures on international law in this Law School of which he is an alumnus.
My pleasure is the greater because Earl Snyder, with whom I have enjoyed a
friendship extending over many years, and his wife Gunhild have been able to
make the journey from Washington to be present on this occasion.
Dr. Snyder has shown a constant devotion to international law for virtually
half a century and the subject is much indebted to him for the varied and
generous ways in which he has supported it. I am happy to recall the
encouragement that he has constantly given to the Research Centre for
International Law at Cambridge. He has endowed a scholarship which

* Honorary Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge; former Director of the Research
Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge.
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annually enables an alumnus of this Law School to spend three months at the
Centre. We have now had the pleasure and benefit of six such visitors. Of
each of them you here in Indiana may be justly proud as possessed of personal
and academic qualities which make them worthy ambassadors of your
scholarly and social tradition. They may be no more than names to you now,
but we remember them in Cambridge with the warmest feelings: Sarah Lynch;
Philip Hatfield; Antje Petersen; Jasmin Rasim; David Laserwitz and currently,
Jack Bobo. In addition to funding the scholarships, Dr. Snyder has given a
considerable sum toward the construction of an extension to the Research
Centre building which will enable us the better to receive future Snyder
scholars and other visitors from abroad.
Now Earl Snyder has taken the initiative in establishing the lectureship
which brings me here today. It will help to link Indiana and Cambridge more
closely. We were delighted that some years ago Dean Aman spent some time
at Cambridge. Now the opportunity exists for a more regular series of
exchanges. I hope that, as the system develops, these visits will extend beyond
a single lecture to something more substantial.
The subject of this lecture is International Law and Private Foreign
Investment. It was suggested by Dr. Snyder as a central one in international
law and one that is close to his interests.
A cynic was once asked, what is the difference in foreign relations
between an investment and a gift? From a gift, he replied, one may derive
some goodwill; but from an investment, one may be relatively sure that little
will be recovered. Even if that pessimistic assessment may not be entirely
accurate in a world where the concept of "debt-forgiveness" is now familiar,
a lawyerly interest in the treatment of foreign investment is fully justified. The
subject is, of course, so large that it must immediately be reduced to
manageable proportions. As between public and private investment, I limit
myself to private investment. As between direct and indirect investment, that
is, portfolio investment, I limit myself to direct investment. This includes
cases where the foreign investor enters into an agreement with a host
government or public authority for the purpose, say, of developing a natural
resource within the host country or where the investor purchases an entire
enterprise, large or small, within the host country. But, truth to tell, the precise
definition of what I mean by "foreign investment" is not critical to my
treatment of the subject. No matter how much I may narrow the topic, it is
evident that I cannot, within the scope of this lecture, attempt in any helpful
manner systematically to expound any significant aspect of it in a
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comprehensive manner. Instead, I propose to use the subject of foreign
investment as an illustration-a paradigm, if I understand that word correctlyof the remarkable changes that have taken place in international law during the
last five decades.
This is a particularly relevant period for me because it corresponds with
the time over which my friendship with Earl Snyder has extended. But it is
relevant, too, because the period is unique in the history of international law.
Never before in the four centuries in which international law has been
identified as a relevant factor in relations between States have there been as
many developments in the content of the subject, both substantive and
procedural, as there have been since 1945.
Did scholars half a century ago-or even a third of a century ago-foresee
the nature and scope of the massive advance in international provision and
machinery for the protection of individual rights?' Could they then have
envisaged the emergence in the Law of the Sea of the 200 mile Exclusive
Economic Zone or of the Common Heritage of Mankind to which pride of
place has been accorded in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention?2 Who would
have imagined that society's awareness of the importance of the environment
would be reflected in such an abundance of international treaty regulation that
the most significant recent study of the subject runs to a thousand pages of
closely packed print?3 Was it to be foreseen fifty years ago that the United
States would jeopardise its standing in the international community by its
hostility to the United Nations and, by withholding its contributions, bring that
organisation to the brink of financial ruin," while at the very same time, that

1. See, principally, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S 171; the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 1.L.M. 673 and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59, together with the massive
jurisprudence that has now accumulated in the various commissions, courts and committees involved in the
functioning of these treaties.
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into
force 16 Nov. 1994).
3. See generally Phillipe Sands, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 1(1994). For
the texts of the treaties, see also SELECTED MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT
(Alexandre Charles Kiss ed., 1983) and SELECTED MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN THE FIELD OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 1I (Iwona Rummel-Bulska and Seth Osato eds. 1991). See also 2 PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (Phillipe Sands et al. eds., 1994); 3 PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Phillipe Sands and Richard G. Tarasofsky eds., 1994).
4. See generally Opening of UN General Assembly, 41 KEESING'S REC. WORLD EVENTS No. 9, at
40754 (Oct. 24, 1995); 50th Anniversary Celebrations, 41 KEESING'S REC. WORLD EVENTS No. 10, at 40802
(Nov. 23, 1995).
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organisation would be stationing forces,5 monitoring elections,6 mediating
disputes in a score of countries, and otherwise institutionally participating in
important peace keeping and peace-restoring activities7 on a scale far
transcending the role originally laid down for it?
The manner in which international law has grown to deal with the
treatment of private foreign investment can properly be compared with its
development in relation to the items which I have just mentioned. In the early
1950s, the law relating to the treatment and protection of private foreign
investment had remained relatively static since the middle of the nineteenth
century. The nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 was
approached in almost the same way as it would have been a century earlier.
Recourse by the Company itself directly against the Iranian Government was
permitted only by a contractual arbitration clause which was found, in the
event, to be defective.' The ability of the British Government effectively then
to espouse the company's claim before the International Court of Justice was
excluded by the restrictive language of Iran's acceptance of the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction.' The substantive law applicable to the case was
customary international law involving a controversial choice between two
conflicting approaches. One was the contention of the British Government,
based on the so-called "Hull Formula," enunciated by U.S. Secretary of State
Cordell Hull in relation to the Mexican oil expropriations just prior to the
Second World War, that called for the payment of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation.' ° The other was a view derived from the extensive

5. For a recent reference, see S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/47 (1991) (regarding Iraq); S.C. Res. 846, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 3244th mtg. at 101, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/49 (1993) (regarding Rwanda); S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 3055th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/48 (1992) (regarding the former Yugoslavia).
6. See, for example, ONUMOZ, the U.N. operation for providing technical assistance and monitoring
the elections in Mozambique in 1994. DEPARTMENT OF PUB. INFO., UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995 (1995). See also UNTAG, the U.N. mission aimed at ensuring free and fair
elections in Namibia in 1989 and UNAVEM II aimed at monitoring the elections in Angola in 1992. Id.
7. See, in recent times, the deployment of UNMOT, the Mission of Observers in Tajikistan; the U.N.
Verification Mission in Guatemala, whose deployment was requested jointly by the Government of
Guatemala and the Union Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca; and the U.N. assessment mission that will
be sent to Sierra Leone to develop recommendations on ways the U.N. could assist the peace process.
United Nations Info. Ctr. for the U.K. and Ireland, NEWS SUMMARY, Feb. 6, 1997.
8. See D.H.N. Johnson, The Constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal, 30 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L LAW 152
(1953).
9. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 i.C.J. 93 (July 22).
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measures of socialization adopted after the Second World War both in Eastern
and Western Europe in which the compensation offered to foreign owners was
no more than a small fraction of the true worth of the property.'" The number
of these takings and the seeming acceptability of the low levels of
compensation paid was seen as evidence of State practice reflective of the true
content of international law on the subject. As it so happened, this disputed
point of law was not at that time decided by an international tribunal as the
parties reached an agreed settlement three years later.'I
But if that was the state of affairs in 1951, the situation today is very
different. I propose in the rest of this lecture to speak of two of these major
differences-one substantive, the other procedural.
The major substantive difference between the position forty years ago and
the position today lies in the increasingly wide acknowledgement that the
proper standard of compensation to be paid upon the taking of foreign property
is that of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. It could not be said
at the time of the Anglo-Iranian episode in 1951 that this was not the standard,
but it was a standard that was accepted only in some quarters-the traditional
capital-exporting States. I have mentioned that it was the view expressed in
1937 by the United States. It was recalled by Britain in 1951. I have
mentioned, too, the strong criticism of the standard by, in particular, the
Eastern European States. They argued, in the context of extensive post-war
socialization, that if the standard of prompt, adequate and effective
compensation were to be insisted upon, this would involve a far-reaching
limitation upon the sovereignty of States. It was, they argued, inherent in the
sovereignty of States that they should be able to regulate and control-even to
the point of nationalization-the use and ownership of property within their
territories. Since few, if any of them, could afford to pay "adequate"
compensation, insistence on this standard would mean either that the State
could not lawfully take foreign property at all or that, if it did take such
property, it would have to devote the product of the property so taken to
generating the funds necessary to pay for it. The sole result of the

10. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U. K. v. Iran) 1952 I.C.J Pleadings at 101-02 (July 2, 1952). See also 4
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERsCH LAUTERPACHT

53-54 (Elihu Lauterpacht

ed., 1978).

11. See generally GILLIAN WHITE, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY (1961).
FOIGHEL, NATIONALIZATION AND COMPENSATION (1963).

See also 1SI

12. Iranian Consortium Agreement, 1954, unpublished, referred to in Mobil Oil Iran Inc., et al. v.
Iran, 16 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 5 (1987).
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nationalization, therefore, would be to transfer title and formal control of the
property to the taking State. However, the latter would not derive any
significant economic benefit from the taking and its true objective would thus
be frustrated."
The criticisms of the prompt, adequate and effective standard did not come
from the Eastern European States alone. They received significant (but by no
means unanimous) academic support from the participants in the debate in the
Institut de Droit International in the late 1940s and early 1950s,' 4 as well as
from many individual writers." We must recall, moreover, that the late Fifties
and the Sixties were the period principally associated with the ending of
colonialism. The extent of this process can be measured in terms of the growth
of membership of the United Nations. In 1958 there were 82 members; in
1970, 124. By 1995 this number had risen to 195. Of course, not all of this
increase came from the ending of colonialism, but most of it did. As a result,
the United Nations became the scene of the most public manifestation of the
controversy-with the now very numerous new States using their voting
strength in the General Assembly to push through, for example, the 1962
resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 6 This contained
an article that limited the obligation of the taking State to the payment of
"appropriate" compensation, as opposed to "adequate" compensation. The
correct meaning of the word "appropriate" has never been authoritatively
resolved. The then Deputy Legal Adviser of the State Department, who was
deeply involved in the negotiation, was Stephen Schwebel, now the President
of the International Court of Justice. 7 He argued strongly that "appropriate"
was intended to have the same meaning as "adequate."' 8 Even so, for many
supporters of the Resolution "appropriate" meant something less than
"adequate" and was intended to support the position of those States which had
only limited funds available to support the exercise of their right to permanent
sovereignty over their resources. Much the same language reappeared in the

13. See, e.g., M.SORNARAiAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1994).
14. See generally ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 42-132 (1950); ANNUAIRE DE
L'INSTITUT DE DRorT INTERNATIONAL 247-323 (1952).
15. See, e.g., SORNARAJAH, supra note 13. For other references, see 2 OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 920 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed, 1992).
16. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963).
17. Judge Schwebel was elected President of the International Court of Justice on Feb. 6, 1997.
InternationalCourt of Justice Elects New Head, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 7, 1997, available in 1997
WL 2054549.
18. STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 405-407 (1994).
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so-called Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the
General Assembly in 1974,19 but with one important difference. Although the
1962 Resolution had sought to reduce the role of international law standards
in relation to takings of property by stating that "appropriate compensation"
shall be paid both in accordance with the rules in force in the taking State and
"in accordance with international law," even the reference to "in accordance
with international law" disappeared in the 1974 text.
The legal effect of these resolutions is, of course, a much debated question.
Some accord to them a quasi-legislative effect. Others deny them all legal
effect. Others seek in them no more than evidence of an accumulation of
individual State practice. But the answer to the question probably does not
greatly matter any more because after the 1974 Resolution the tide began to
turn. No longer was the question of compensation seen simplistically as an
issue between north and south, between new countries and old or between
developing and developed countries. This kind of dichotomy was replaced by
a growing awareness on the part of investment-receiving countries that
economic development could not be assured on the basis of public lending
alone, whether by States or by international organizations. It had to be
supported by private investment. It was realized that there was unlikely to be
sufficient foreign private investment to meet all development needs. In the
competitive situation thus resulting, private investment would be more likely
to flow toward the safest areas. So, gradually, the right to nationalize or
otherwise take foreign property, though never denied, came to be conditioned
on the need for the payment of compensation at a level higher than that
signified by the word "appropriate."
The evolution of such trends cannot be presented on a strictly
chronological basis. One cannot say that the old standard was "adequate," that
the new standard suddenly became "appropriate" and that there was then a
gradual but complete reversion to "adequate." That would be to overlook the
necessary distinction between customary international law and treaty law-with
the content of the former being more gradually formed and, consequently,
more elusive and obscure than the latter. It would also be to disregard the fact
that in terms of evidencing the policy of States viewed collectively the
emergence of a uniform treaty pattern has some bearing on the content of
customary international law.

19. G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
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And so it should not come as a surprise to find that even before the
adoption of the Permanent Sovereignty resolution of 1962 there were already
in existence a number of bilateral treaties, sometimes called treaties of
friendship, commerce, and navigation, sometimes called treaties of amity or
establishment, that, amongst other matters, regulated takings of property by
reference to a standard of fair compensation reflecting the market value of the
property. One such treaty was the 1955 Treaty of Amity between the United
States and Iran which has played an important role in a number of cases
brought both in the International Court of Justice and in the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal?0 However, these treaties tended to be concluded between developed
States, with money to invest, and developing countries, anxious to obtain
foreign funding. Arguably, therefore, the latter may have been the more
willing to compromise their positions.
The vocabulary in which the standard of compensation was expressed
varied from treaty to treaty. Some provided for "compensation" with no
qualifying adjective but added the requirement that it "shall represent the
equivalent of the investments affected." Coupled with the further requirement
that the compensation should be actually realizable and freely transferable
without undue delay, such provisions assured the investor of a significant
measure of legal protection, provided always that there was some suitable
mechanism for dispute settlement which would effectively apply the agreed
standard of compensation-a matter to which I shall return presently. An early
example of a treaty of this kind was the one concluded between Germany and
Pakistan in 1959.21
From then on the treaty repositories become increasingly filled with
express compensation provisions describing the compensation payable by such
adjectives as "fair," "just," "effective," "full" and "reasonable." But for all this
variation of wording the net result must now be taken to be that the
expropriating State cannot look to nationalization or expropriation as a means
of enriching itself at the expense of the foreign investor.
The contemporary scene is dominated (though not exclusively) by a series
of bilateral investment treaties described generally under the unsurprising

20. E.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1982 I.C.J. 3 (May 24);
American International Group, Inc. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 96 (1983); Esphahanian v. Bank
Tajarat, 2 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 157 (1983).
21. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 25, 1959, Pak.-F.R.G., 457 U.N.T.S.
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acronym of BITS.' There are now some 400 of these treaties creating a web
of relationships between some 145 States in every part of the globe and,
therefore, to a large extent reducing the space available for the operation of
customary international law rules. And these agreements-unlike those of two
or three decades earlier-are not limited in their range to States which are
traditionally respectively investment-importing and investment-exporting.
Thus, to give an illustration, China and Turkey concluded an agreement in
1990 much in accordance with the standard form.' As regards the standards
of compensation to be paid, most BITS say much the same thing, namely, that
the compensation shall be prompt, adequate and effective or that it shall be
equal to the real or reasonable or market value of the property taken. But here,
in referring to the value of the property taken, we come to an additional
element in the situation of which the significance is sometimes not fully
appreciated.
In theory, a clear distinction should be drawn between the standardof
compensation to be paid and the value to be put upon the property for the
purpose of applying the standard of compensation. Thus the value of an asset
should be objectively determinable: it is worth whatever it is worth, regardless
of whether the authority taking the property is required to compensate for that
worth fully or only in part. The value of the refinery can be assessed by one
or another economic techniques of valuation at, say, $10 million. If full
compensation is to be paid, that is the amount payable. If half compensation
is to be paid, only $5 million will be payable. So it is clear that in legal terms
the identification of the standard of compensation payable is a legal question
of prime importance. The actual valuation, however, should be an objective
and separate process.'

22. See, e.g, Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Jan. 23, 1987, U.K.Dominica, 3 ICSID Investment Treaties 1987-a; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investments, Dec. 3, 1985, U.S.-Turk., 25 I.L.M. 85; Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection of Investments, Sept. 23, 1981, Sri Lanka-Switz7, 21 I.L.M. 399; Agreement on the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Jan. 28, 1977, Egypt-Japan, 18 I.L.M 44 (entered
into force Jan. 14, 1978). For a general study of BITS, see RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); Margrete Stevens and Ruvan de Alwis, References on Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 7 ICSID REVIEW-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L. J. 229 (1992). See also Mohamed I. Khalil,
Treatment of Foreign Investment in BilateralInvestment Treaties, 7 ICSID REVIEW-FoREIGN INVESTMENT
L.J. 339 (1992); Alejandro Escobar, Introductory Note on BilateralInvestment Treaties Recently Concluded
by Latin American States, 11 ICSIDREviEw-FoREIGN INVESTMENT L. J. 86 (1996).
23. Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 13, 1990,
P.R.C.-Turk., 4 ICSID Investment Treaties Release 95-2.
24.

ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 130-136

(1991). See also Elihu Lauterpacht, Law andPolicy in InternationalResource Development, II J. ENERGY
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Nonetheless, a certain confusion has arisen between the two processes.
This is illustrated by the Hong Kong-New Zealand bilateral investment treaty
of 1993: "compensation shall amount to the real value of the investment
immediately before the deprivation ....[W]here the value cannot be readily

ascertained the compensation shall be determined in accordance with generally
recognized principles of valuation and equitable principles taking into account
the capital invested, depreciation, capital already repatriated, replacement
value, currency exchange rates and other relevant factors."25
So far as I have been able to make out (and I have had to rely on the text
of the agreement alone), this provision does not appear to be matched in any
of the other BITS which are all expressed in more traditional language. Let us
analyze it, first, in terms of the compensation standard which it sets.
"Compensation shall amount to the real value of the property." This in effect
prescribes the standard of full compensation. When you say "compensation
shall amount to" you are saying "compensation shall be equal to." You are not
saying that "compensation shall be half equal to." But having defined the
standard of compensation in terms of "the real value" of the property, the
provision has rightly indicated that a value must then be put on the property
in question.
And here we come to the unusual element-a reference to the process of
valuation. What does the Treaty say about that? First, it contemplates the
general possibility that the value can be "readily ascertained," for it introduces
the rest of the sentence with the words "where that value cannot be readily
." A "readily ascertainable value" is one that can be discovered
ascertained ....

simply, because the asset in question is one which is in common supply and is
often traded, such as a basic commodity like tin, copper, pork bellies or
whatever. But it is not commodities like these that are normally taken by a
State for a public purpose. Rather the State may take a hotel, a bottling plant,
a mine or a refinery and such like assets, the market value of which will vary
according to function, age, location and so on.
When it comes to valuing assets such as these we are in the field of
economics, not law. The economists tell us what is the proper method of
measurement. If, therefore, the treaty is to say anything about valuation, it
should be directing us to some established economic method: net book value;

&NAT. RESOURCES L. 145 (1993).

25. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, July 6, 1995, H.K.-N.2., 6 ICSID
Investment Treaties Release 96-2.
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replacement value; tax value; or, most likely, a value based on discounted cash
flow.'
The Hong Kong-New Zealand Treaty does this only in part by
providing that "where the value cannot be readily ascertained the
compensation shall be determined in accordance with generally recognized
principles."
So far so good. But then it does something which, so far as I can ascertain,
is quite unusual in these treaties: it introduces a new conception into the
otherwise objective task of valuation--the idea of "equitableprinciples taking
into account the capital invested, depreciation, capital already repatriated,
replacement value, currency exchange rates and other relevant factors." Some
of these additional considerations, as can readily be seen, are not entirely
objective in character, but introduce into the valuation process some degree of
subjectivity involving an assessment of the conduct of the owner of the
property during the period of ownership. The use of the words "equitable
principles" invites the judge or arbitrator performing the valuation to form a
view of the behaviourof the owner of the property--a matter which can have
no connection with the objective value of the property even though it may be
material to the level of compensation which the owner should receive. It is to
be compared with the introduction in 1969 of the same concept-of "equitable
principles"--into the law relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf.27
Many feel that the role played by that concept in that context is open to
significant criticism. This is not to say that discretion has no place in the
valuation process. For example, the application of the method most favoured
in relation to a complex asset like a refinery or an oil production business, the
discounted cash flow approach, is crucially dependent upon the choice of the
appropriate rate at which the future stream of profit is to be discounted, as well
as on the length of the period for which the projection is to be made.' But
while those choices are largely discretionary, they are nevertheless governed
by essentially objective considerations. The relevance to an objective
valuation (as opposed to the level of compensation) of, for example, the
amount of the "capital already repatriated" is highly questionable.
However, I have digressed into a technicality which is relevant to our
theme only insofar as it shows the awareness of at least some States of the

26. See, e.g. Starrett Housing Corporation etal v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112 (1981). See
generally Charles N. Brower, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 224 RECUEIL DES COURS 127 etseq.
(1990-V).
27. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (February 20).
28. See Starrett Housing Corporation, supra, note 26.
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importance of giving the international law of compensation deeper content.
This represents an advance on the view hitherto widely accepted that it is
sufficient merely to set an appropriate compensation standard and then leave
it to a tribunal, without further guidance, to make the necessary valuation.
This advance has no doubt been encouraged by the important jurisprudence of
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal over the past fifteen years--a subject too
extensive to be further discussed here. 9
So let me return to conclude the identification of treaties which are
contributing to the growing acknowledgement of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation as the appropriate standard of compensation to be paid.
Two further recent examples especially call for mention.
One is the European Energy Charter Treaty of December 1994.3" This
provides in Article 13(1) that the nationalization or expropriation of
investments of investors of a Contracting Party shall be "accompanied by the
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation." This is defined as
"the fair market value" of the investment. The Treaty is of special importance
because it was signed by 49 States and is already provisionally applicable to
at least 25 of them. The States involved are primarily European and include
virtually all of the States of Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union.
But it also includes a number of non-European States, notably Australia and
Japan, with the possibility in due course of participation by Canada and the
United States. So we have here a wide range of States adhering on a
multilateral and reciprocal basis to the standard of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation and supporting it-as we shall presently see-with an
effective means of dispute settlement.
The same is true of the second example, the North American Free Trade
Agreement between Canada, Mexico and the United States, where similar
standards are prescribed. Thus, Article 1110.2 provides that "Compensation
shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment..
. Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset value including
declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as appropriate to
determine fair market value."'"

29. See generally Brower, supra, note 26; Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Reports.
30. European Energy Charter Treaty, openedfor signature Feb 1, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 360.
31. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992,32 I.L.M. 605, 641. Since the
delivery of this lecture, publicity has been given to a further multilateral arrangement which, when it enters
into force, will be of major importance. The draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, currently being
negotiated in the O.E.C.D., also incorporates the requirement of "prompt, adequate and effective
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To this treaty evidence of the crystallisation of the prompt, adequate and
effective standard must also be added--in a manner which must be limited to
a mere passing reference--recent arbitral experience. This is to be found
principally in recent times in the work of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and of
the ICSID arbitral tribunals. These tribunals have generated a number of
significant arbitral decisions which support the evidence of the content of
customary international law to be perceived in the pattern of treaties to which
I have been referring. 2
The mention of these arbitral bodies provides me with a bridge between
the two sections of this lecture-the first dealing with substantive advances
(which I now end) and the second with procedural advances (to which I now
turn).
Important as is the advance to certainty in relation to the level of
compensation, it would be much less significant were it not accompanied by
certain major developments in the procedures relating to the making of
compensation claims. These procedures enable individuals and corporations
to act effectively on their own behalf in a manner never realistically
contemplated, though frequently prayed for, forty years ago.
In this connection we can concentrate upon processes involving third-party
settlement of disputes by reference to law.
It is not necessary to recall here the defects in the earlier period revealed
at the time of the nationalization in 1951 of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
These have already been mentioned.33
Since 1951, however, international practice has evolved so considerably
that the possibility of any specific dispute now falling outside the scope of one
dispute settlement procedure or another is significantly reduced, though it has
not disappeared entirely.
First, the dispute settlement clauses inserted in agreements between
investors and the host Government have become much more sophisticated.
Most such agreements now contain watertight provisions which will exclude
any attempt by the host State unilaterally to frustrate an arbitration. The model
for this development was established in the very agreement which settled the
Iranian oil dispute in 1954--the so-called Consortium Agreement.14 The

compensation" expressed in terms of "fair market value."
32. See Brower, supra, note 26, at 336-350 (relating to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal).
33. See supra p. 262.
34. Iranian Consortium Agreement, supra note 12.
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essence of the relevant provision in this agreement was that in the event of a
dispute each party was obliged to nominate an arbitrator and, if either failed
to do so, the other could request the President of the ICJ to make the
appointment. Recalling the defects in the provision in the 1933 Concession
which had conferred a similar power on the President of the PCIJ, but which
had collapsed because the PCIJ had ceased to exist in 1945, six years before
the dispute arose, the Parties inserted a succession clause to the effect that if
the office of President of the ICJ were to disappear the appointing function
would descend to whomsoever might be the President of the "successor"
tribunal. Comparably "watertight" provisions now appear in most resource
development agreements concluded directly between States and foreign
investors. They are also often incorporated in national legislation establishing
model clauses. The recent student of the subject may take such provisions for
granted. But their novelty, and the spirit which underlies them, should be
recognised.
Another, but more technical aspect of the growing acknowledgement of
the position of the individual and of the corporation in international law is the
acceptance by many Contracting States and by a number of international
tribunals that the proper law of contracts between States and non-State parties
can be something other than a given system of national domestic law. In 1929
the PCIJ, in the case of the Serbian Loans, applying the strictly positivist
doctrine of the 19' century, enunciated the doctrine that international law
could be applied only to relations between States and that other relationships
were necessarily governed by national law.35 Not so today. The procedural
capacity of the individual in direct State/investor relationships has been
accompanied by the acknowledgement that such contracts may be lifted
outside the sphere of domestic law and are to be governed instead in
accordance with international law or general principles of law. Moreover,
many such agreements also include provisions which prohibit any unilateral
amendment by the States parties--so-called "stabilization" clauses.
If, strictly speaking, these advances are to be viewed as substantive aspects
of the relationship between States and foreign investors, they are nevertheless
so closely related to the process by which disputes arising out of such
relationships are to be adjudicated that, at this point, some reference to these
procedures is permissible--the more so because one of the most significant

35. Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Serb.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.20,
at41 (July 12).
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areas in which the direct application of international law to State/investor
relations occurs is in the operation of the so-called ICSID system?6
ICSID was established in 1966. The letters stand for the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, an institution set up under
the auspices of the World Bank. It was the product of the imagination and
energy of the then-General Counsel of the Bank, Mr. Broches. Basically, the
system enhanced the arbitration provisions in investment agreements between
private parties and host States by giving such clauses treaty support and
protection. It acknowledged, incidentally, the possibility of the direct
application of international law in any arbitration arising under such
contracts. 37 The system is predicated upon the national State of the investor
and the investment-receiving State both being parties to the ICSID
Convention. It is then possible for the investor and host State to insert in the
investment agreement an "ICSID Arbitration Clause." This brings compulsory
arbitration under the ICSID system of disputes into the investment agreement.
The Centre administers the process. The applicant places the case before the
Centre. If the respondent fails to cooperate in the establishment of the arbitral
tribunal the Centre ensures the completion of the tribunal. 38 The award is, of
course, in any event contractually binding between the parties.39 But the
Convention additionally constitutes for the State-party to the dispute a treaty
obligation to implement the award. If the respondent State fails to meet its
obligations under the Convention, the national State of the private party is
entitled to treat that non-implementation as a breach of treaty committed
against it. More directly helpful, however, is the obligation of the Parties to
the Convention to provide within their domestic legislation for the direct
enforceability of ICSID awards just as if they were the judgments of foreign
courts.'

Some time after the original Convention was concluded, provision was
made for the extension of the ICSID facilities to contracts where only one of
the relevant States is a party to the Convention. This Additional Facility, as
it is called, is theoretically important as showing that the applicability of the
proper law provision of the system is not-as some would suggest in relation

36.
37.
Nationals
38.
39.
40.

For the relevant texts, see I ICSID REP. 3-273 (R. Rayfuse ed., 1965).
See, especially, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 42, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 186.
Id art. 38, at 184.
Id art. 53, at 194.
Id art. 54(l).
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to the ICSID system itself-dependent upon a treaty relationship between the
host State and the State of nationality of the investor.
The ICSID procedures have now been made available on an even wider
scale by the practice of referring to them in bilateral investment treaties. The
importance of this lies in the fact that, whereas what we may call the standard
ICSID procedures operate only in relation to disputes arising under contracts
which contain a specific provision for ICSID settlement, the ICSID provisions
in the BITS make the ICSID procedures available in non-contract cases or in
contract cases where no reference was made to ICSID.
The same pattern of providing in a separate treaty that private parties may
have recourse to arbitration under the ICSID system is to be found in both the
European Energy Charter and in the NAFTA-both already referred to.42
All these developments are striking and significant because they put an
end to the myth, so prevalent until the end of the Second World War, that only
States are subjects of international law and that individuals cannot possess
rights or bear duties directly under international law. We have in this respect
moved into a new age, in which we have also seen the emergence of parallel
and better known developments both in the field of human rights and of the
law of the sea. In those great areas also, the individual rights of procedural
access to international bodies have developed on an even more striking scale.
As we move towards the end of this presentation, mention should also be
made of the emergence of an international system to insure investors against
non-commercial risks, especially expropriation. National systems for the same
purpose have long existed in the United States and other countries. Now
MIGA, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, established in 1985,
makes such insurance available on an international basis."3 The system is
founded on an international treaty, the MIGA Convention, and is available to
investors who are nationals of a party to the Convention in respect of
investments--both equity investments and direct investments--made in the
territory of a developing country that is also a party to the Convention and
approves the issuance of the guarantee.
41. ICSID Additional Facility, I ICSID REP., supranote 36, at 213. See also Arbitration(Additional
Facility)Rules, 1 ICSID REP., supranote 36, at 249 (with special reference to Art. 55, at 268).
42. See supranotes 30-31 and acompanying text.
43. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M.
1605. See generally IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, MIGA AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ORIGINS, OPERATIONS,
POLICIES AND BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY (1988);
IBRAHIM F.I. SHHATA, THE WORLD BANK INACHANGING WORLD (1991) (containing a reprint of the text
of the Agreement).
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This has necessarily been an incomplete review of the impact of
developments during the last half-century upon the law relating to the
treatment of foreign private investment. You will have no difficulty in
identifying some of the major issues that I have not covered, like the definition
of what is a taking, the treatment of corporate claims and the rights of
shareholders, the effect of clauses in investment agreements intended to
exclude or limit the right of the State to interfere with the contract, and the
distinction between lawful and unlawful takings. I have not neglected them
because they are unimportant.
But despite these omissions, the message is clear: in the treatment of
investment, as of so many other topics of international law, there have, in the
space of less than fifty years, been changes of which an earlier generation
could hardly have dreamed. If some had faith at the beginning of the period
in the eventual general acknowledgement of the "prompt, adequate and
effective" standard of compensation, few could have foreseen the extent to
which the individual or the corporation would acquire status as independent
actors on the international stage. For decades the procedural incapacity of
non-State entities was proclaimed as an article of faith. Today that incapacity
is scarcely recognizable.
For most of us these developments signify progress. Even so, we should
not be lulled into thinking that there is no room for further change or that such
changes will necessarily be an advance in terms of the standards we welcome
today.
We must, of course, try and think of the direction in which the law will
move. In terms of standards of the treatment of property we should not assume
that the content of the law is not like a pendulum and that rules which have
swung one way will not eventually reverse their direction. Difficult though it
is to see why the current standards should change, one cannot exclude the
possibility that the worldwide trend toward privatization which has reduced the
importance of considerations pertinent to nationalization will not last forever.
Economic conditions within particular States may alter to such a degree that
hostility to foreign investors will once again emerge and that States will no
longer see advantage in according them special protection. Will such a
reversion to the conditions of the period 1950-1980 lead to a change back to
the standards of that time? Are we in a ratchet situation-like a cog which,
having turned in one direction, cannot be turned back again? To such question
no confident answer can be given. Much will depend upon the fate of the
bilateral and of the multilateral treaties which have been emerging in recent
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years.
We must not forget that the bilateral treaties, on which the
improvements that I have identified depend so much, are not of unlimited
duration. The general pattern of these treaties is that they are expressed to last
for periods of ten or fifteen years, and that thereafter notice may be given to
terminate them. It is true that if they are denounced, the protection they
provide is assured for a further twenty years to investments made in reliance
upon them. But it is a fact that these treaties can be brought to an end.
However, even if we cannot exclude the possibility of a change in the
substantive rules, it seems much less likely that the procedural advances will
be reversed. True, the procedural capacity of individuals is the result of
specific treaty provisions and that those provisions appear in the same treaties
as contain the substantive standards that are open to change in the manner just
described. Yet while it is possible to contemplate changes in standards, it is
difficult to foresee the denial to individuals of the procedural competence that
has now been so widely conferred on them. It is an old maxim that freedom
once conferred cannot be withdrawn; and so, I believe, it is likely to be with
the freedom that has now been given to individuals to assert their rights on the
international plane. This is the more likely to be true because these individual
procedural rights extend beyond the protection of property to the whole range
of political and civil rights as well as to the protection of the environment.
And so I conclude having, I hope, been able to show how in one area of
law the rules of international society have moved in half a century onto a
higher plane; and though prophecy is a dangerous thing, I see the standards as
likely to stay there, even though they may undergo some change; while the
procedures will stay there because they are a reflection of the major societal
move toward the acknowledgement of the individual as the ultimate unit of our
international community.

